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Abstract. In this work the concept of computational agent is located
within the methodological framework of levels and domains of descrip-
tion of a calculus in the context of different usual paradigms in Artificial
Intelligence (symbolic, situated, connectionist, and hybrid). Emphasis in
the computable aspects of agent theory is put, leaving open the possi-
bility to the incorporation of other aspects that are still pure cognitive
nomenclature without any computational counterpart of equivalent se-
mantic richness. These ideas are currently being implemented on semi-
automatic video-surveillance.
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1 Introduction
The concept of agent comes from the persistent attempt in Science and Engi-
neering to modularize the knowledge necessary to specify a calculus, and of the
later attempt to progressively increase the level of complexity and autonomy,
making them re-usable. Agent theory takes from Artificial Intelligence (AI) the
general intention to approach the functionality of biological systems. Thus, there
are adaptive, intelligent, intentional agents, with learning capacity and equipped
with a certain level of social organization that allows cooperation in the accom-
plishment of “group tasks”. In this sense, the objectives of multi-agent systems
(MAS) agree with distributed AI (DAI) [27]. “Nature-inspired computation” [18]
is also practically isomorphic to agent and MAS theory. This is true at the level
of individual agents (“organisms”) as well as at the level of social organizations
in MAS (ants, bees, human societies, collective games, etc.). In this last case,
to the functionalities demanded for the individual behavior, it is necessary to
 This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor José Mira, a great researcher,
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add the use of an interaction language among agents that allows to share goals
and to coordinate the collective plans used to reach those goals. But, usually
the specification and the modeling of the environment is forgotten. However, its
richness, diversity and other characteristics are fundamental to understand the
dynamics of the agent-system interaction.
In this work we approach the general concept of agent from a computational
perspective. We consider that an agent starts being a conceptual model, later
it is reduced to a formal model and finally to a physical machine with sensors,
effectors and a control program. The agent concept is located within the method-
ological framework of description levels and domains of a calculus. Independently
of the cognitive characteristics being assigned to an agent (intentions, purposes,
beliefs, desires, emotions, or conscience), to our opinion an agent is a “compu-
tational agent”, which performs a calculation in a physical machine having an
interface (human or electromechanical) with an external environment.
2 Computational Agents in Perspective
Historically, Cybernetics introduced the concept of system, clearly analogous to
the agent one. Physics and Engineering continue preferring to use the system
concept, to which less cognitive characteristics are assigned. On the other hand,
it is much more precise and operational, since its dynamics can be described
in terms of differential equations - usual in Physics and Control Theory - and
of combinatory and sequential logic - proper of computation and integrated in
finite state automata (FSA) theory. In the end, when reformulating any defi-
nition in natural language of an agent in a computable form, it is also ended
up using algorithms and automata. The initial cybernetical proposal consisting
in studying the representation, calculation, communication and control systems,
can now be rewritten in terms of agents to obtain a first general agent classifi-
cation: representation, calculation, communication and control agents. Each one
of these functions is characterized to have a clear objective (a goal), and to im-
plicitly take the distinction between information (message) and energy (signal).
Wiener [28] established the distinction between signal and information, and as-
sociated “purposes” to goal states, or “consigns” in feedback loops. This way,
the concepts described in cognitive language are anchored in Physics, Engineer-
ing and Mathematics. McCulloch [13] and von Neumann [26] constructed the
modular automata theory and applied it to the formal description of neuronal
networks and the synthesis of computers. Additionally, von Neumann addressed
self-reproduction, self-reparation and tolerance to failure problems, which are
nowadays also associated to agents (e.g. [2],[6],[7]).
With the arrival of AI, the initial formulations of connectionism (artificial neu-
ronal networks and modular theory of deterministic and probabilistic automata)
are partially obscured by new symbolic formulations based in rules. Here the
inference is understood as a search process in a states space. Thus, the idea of
“actors” appears, like a concurrent computation model in distributed systems
[1]. Along with object-oriented programming [15] these are the antecedents of
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the agents. Conceptually, it is Minsky [16] who raises the social idea of agency,
essentially basing on “personification” of the verbs used in natural language to
describe the necessary processes for the execution of a certain activity (“build”,
“see”, “grasp”, “move”, “release”). The strategy to describe in natural language
an agent’s “beliefs”, “desires” and “intentions” and later to develop the formal
counterpart of the linguistic terms, is still used at the present time [23]. In fact,
a complete agent language is dominant in Software Engineering (SE) [19], and
its importance also grows in Knowledge Engineering (KE) [3]. It is advisable
to indicate that, as with the term of AI, in the agents field there is usually an
abuse of excessively loaded cognitive nomenclature of anthropomorphous seman-
tics. Finally, during implementation, there is no remedy than to reduce to algo-
rithms and automata, and to entities and relations of the existing programming
languages.
3 Levels and Domains in Agent Models
Since the introduction of the knowledge level by Newell [17] and Marr [10] -
called “theory of calculus” -, it is usual to describe the knowledge necessary
to understand any calculation in three levels: physical (PL), symbols (SL) and
knowledge (KL). Or, in a simpler way: machine hardware, programs and models,
and algorithms. Starting from the idea of reference systems in Physics and the
proposals by Maturana [12] and Varela [25] in Biology, in 1978 [14] the figure
of the external observer in computation is introduced. This gives rise to two
description domains of the organizations and relations at each level: (1) the own
domain of the level (OD), where the causality is intrinsic and the semantics
comes imposed by the structure and dynamics of the level, and, (2) the external
observer domain (EOD) to the computation carried out in that level, where the
semantics is arbitrary and the interpretation of the calculation depends of the
observer and, in general, of the application domain.
When superposing both domains (OD, EOD), at the three levels ((KL, SL,
PL), we obtain a building of three plants and six apartments (two by plant), in
which the agents reside (see Fig. 1). Thus, we have agents (OD-PL), (EOD-PL),
(EOD-SL), etc. That is to say, the knowledge necessary to specify an agent may
be decomposed into six elements: models (EOD, OD), programs (EOD, OD)
and machines EOD, OD). When one or more of these components is the relevant
one (assuming the existence of the others), this one gives the generic name to
the agent. Thus, for example, robots are essentially physical agents because it is
assumed that the greater complexity is associated to the design of its sensors and
effectors, independently of their navigation programs. In an analogous manner,
a great part of agents usual in IS is symbolic because it is assumed that most of
its complexity is associated to the construction of a program whose interface is
human (through screen and keyboard) and we do not need to worry about the
design of the body of this type of agents.
Finally, the majority of the current most ambitious proposals are conceptual
agents, at level of knowledge, and, more exactly, knowledge agents in the external
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EXTERNAL OBSERVER  OWN DOMAIN        
        DOMAIN (EOD)           (OD) 
KL: Cognitive entities (perceptions, goals, plans) 
SL: Spatio-temporal patterns (objects & events) 
PL: Physical signals and circuits 
Fig. 1. The three nested levels (PL, SL, KL) and the two domains (EOD, OD) of
description of the calculus performed by an agent
observer domain (KL-EOD) because their implementation only exists in natural
language. Those components of a KL-EOD agent that may be formalized in
terms of algorithms, ANN or FSA (that is to say, of its underlying formal model),
already are KL-OD agents, leaving all the own semantics of the EOD. For
example, the intentions and desires are now sets (classes) and the transition
diagrams among states (elements of a class) are now matrixes. Analogously, the
beliefs (the knowledge base), when passing from EOD to OD, are reduced to
inferential rules, frames, logical entities, graphs or causal networks. And, most of
the current architectures of “social agents” and “intentional agents” (BDI [22],
for instance), are essentially developments at knowledge level and in the external
observer domain.
4 Computational Agent Conceptual Model (KL-EOD)
Like in AI and Robotics, in the agency three basic architectures are distinguished
- symbolic, situated and connectionist -, to approach different solutions to a prob-
lem, by modeling data and knowledge and later operating the inferences of the
model. An agent is symbolic when it uses declaratory and explicit knowledge
in natural language to describe the constituent organizations (“concepts”) and
the inference rules. In Robotics this is associated to “deliberative architectures”,
which spend time and a high number of computational resources in the decision
process. The associated tasks usually are diagnosis, planning, and inductive and
case-based reasoning (CBR) learning. Most knowledge-based systems (KBS) fol-
low this paradigm. An agent is reactive or situated when knowledge representa-
tion is within two configuration tables of precalculated input and output, usually
called “perceptions” and “actions”. Here, the inference procedure is of “reflex”
type (stimulus-response), very fast and adapted for real-time applications. The
perception-action link is also given by a table or a automata with few states. It
is proper for monitoring tasks and for the execution phase of motor planning,
where a command is decomposed into a set of precalculated elementary actions
that execute in “efficient” time, without having to deliberate. An agent is con-
nectionist when knowledge representation is given in terms of labeled numerical
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lines, as much for the inputs as for the outputs, and the inference functions are
adjustable numerical associators.
It is difficult to have all the necessary knowledge for an application. For that
reason, the most frequent situations demand hybrid solutions, with reactive and
deliberative, and with symbolic and connectionist parts. For that reason, in
the agency paradigm, there are also hybrid architectures that combine agents
of reactive and deliberative type. The reactive part reacts to the events of the
environment without investing reasoning, whereas the deliberative support plans
(it distributes the simplest goals) and performs tasks of superior abstraction
level. Hybrid architectures are organized horizontally, so that the layers have
access to sensors and actuators, and vertically, where a layer acts as an interface
to sensors and actuators.
Finally, it is our conjecture that only two basic types of agent exist: (1) the
ones based on descriptions in EOD that use declarative knowledge in natural
language, and, (2) those based on mechanisms of the OD, causal in the imple-
mentation of the three mentioned levels. Whichever the final version of the agent
at knowledge level (KL-EOD) should be, the following phase is to operationalize
its entities and relations, its data and inferences. The formal model most used
for the description of abstract agent architectures is automata theory.
5 A Case Study in Visual Surveillance
The previous concepts are being applied in semi-automatic visual surveillance
tasks [5],[8],[9],[11],[21],[24] composed of a set of collaborative cameras installed
in a building and a camera-mounted mobile robot to offer pre-alarms and/or
alarms detected indoor and outdoor. The video images captured by each of
the cameras enable segmenting and tracking objects of interest (obtained as
image blobs) with the objective of providing meaningful events and suspicious
activities. The cameras collaborate in the sense of obtaining richer surveillance
observations that are only available through the fusion of information captured
on various places. The mobile robot may be used if necessary to navigate to
zones not monitored by fixed cameras or to dangerous places. People roaming or
abandoning an object are some typical suspicious surveillance situations. After
explaining this initial specification, an Analysis Overview Diagram [20] as shown
in Fig. 2 is gotten.
The original diagram has been adapted to clearly show the three levels (PL,
SL and KL) exposed previously. In this scheme there are physical agents Cam-
era, Robot and Alarm Center at PL. On the next level, SL, software agents
(Camera Agent, Situation Agent, Social Agent, Coordinator Agent and Historic
Agent), message events (Inform Event, Inform Situation, Command Camera
Agent, Command Situation Agent and Alert Alarm Central), as well as believes
data Image Database, Situation Database are shown. Lastly, the KL includes
goals, perceptions and actions, as described earlier. At top level, the main goal
is Detect anomalous situation from which all subgoals are derived. Perceptions
are also simplified into one general percept called Behavior annotated video.




Fig. 2. Analysis Overview Diagram for a semi-automatic video-surveillance system
The actions shown in the figure are proper of any surveillance task faced from
computer vision and robotics.
A more precise system specification is detailed next. A physical Camera pro-
vides the system (concretely to Camera Agent and Mobile Robot Agent) with the
environment information captured. The Camera Agent has the ability to control
the camera to move it in horizontal and vertical direction, and even change the
zoom. This control is represented by means of action Camera Control. Similarly,
Mobile Robot Agent has the ability to control the movements of the physical
Robot (for example to advance, to turn down, to turn right or left, to accelerate,
to stop, etc.). This ability is determined by means of action Robot Control. The
Camera Agent analyzes input videos (it is represented as an action) to later send
it to Historic Agent, which will store it in the Image Database. For example, an
annotated image could be the face of a suspicious person. The Camera Agent is
also in charge of studying an image or a sequence of images to understand what
is happening in the field of vision. By means of this study, behaviors, actions,
trajectories, etc., are obtained. The Mobile Robot Agent also incorporates these
abilities (represented by actions Analyze Image and Capture Image) because the
robot is also equipped with a built-in camera. The Camera Agent communicates
the Situation Agent the events that it has detected. Now, Situation Agent has
the objective to detect anomalous situations. In addition, it sends commands to
the Mobile Robot Agent or Camera Agent (through message Command Camera
Agent). It sends a command to the Camera Agent to communicate a need of
coordination (when an event happens through several cameras), to request that
it captures an image, or that it performs a zoom, etc. It sends a command to the
mobile robot to navigate to the place where a possible suspicious event, which
has fallen out of the visual field of the cameras, is taking place. The Situation
Agent communicates with Historic Agent to ask for the events stored in the Sit-
uation Database. In this data base the situations and the behaviors considered
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Field of vision C2
Non-visible area
Camera C1 Camera C2
Field of vision C1
Person P
Fig. 3. A sidewalk with two non-overlapping cameras
Fig. 4. Goal “Detect hiding person”
suspicious are stored. The Situation Agent communicates to Social Agent that a
suspicious situation has happened (message Inform Situation). In the Situation
Database the detected suspicious situations are registered.
Let us now approach one possible suspicious situation detection at KL and
represented in Fig 3. Two cameras are focusing on a sidewalk and a person is
walking along it. One sub-goal of “Detect anomalous situation” is “Detect hiding
person”. As shown in Fig. 4, action Establish pre-alarm comes from consecutively
analyzing perceptions “P in C1”, “not (P in C1) and not (P in C2)” and “timeout
T” at knowledge level and in the external observer domain. The meanings for
these perceptions are “the person P is present in the field of vision of camera 1”,
“the person P is neither present in the field of vision of camera 1, nor in the field
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Relation between OD and EOD in image segmentation. (a) Blob in the OD.
(b) Person in the EOD.
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Table 1. OD-EOD relation for goal “Detect hiding person” (simplified to a single
camera)
OD EOD
No blob at t − 1
No blob at t
No person in camera 1 field of vision
[ ]
No blob at t − 1
Blob at the left part of image at t
Person P arrives to camera C1 field of vision from the
left
[ Arrives (P,L,C1) ]
No blob at t − 1
Blob at the right part of image at t
Person P arrives to camera C1 field of vision from the
right
[ Arrives (P,R,C1) ]
Blob at the left part of image at t − 1
Blob at any central part of image at t
Person P walks in camera C1 field of vision
[ Walks (P,C1) ]
Blob at any central part of image at t − 1
Blob at any central part of image at t
Person P walks in camera C1 field of vision
[ Walks (P,C1) ]
Blob at the right part of image at t − 1
Blob at any central part of image at t
Person P walks in camera C1 field of vision
[ Walks (P,C1) ]
Blob at any central part of image at t − 1
Blob at the right part of image at t
Person P leaves camera C1 field of vision to the right
[ Leaves (P,R,C1) ]
Blob at any central part of image at t − 1
Blob at the left part of image at t
Person P leaves camera C1 field of vision to the left



















Fig. 6. Automata including state suspicious activity “Person hiding”
of vision of camera 2”, and “a period superior to T has elapsed since the person
P left the field of vision of camera 1 in the direction of camera 2” respectively.
An “intelligent” system should consider this as a suspicious situation. Evidently,
this representation may only be described at EOD, where the information has
passed from the OD through a domain dependent knowledge injection.
Fig. 5 shows a simple example of the relation between OD and EOD in
a typical visual surveillance task. In the OD, there is a segmented blob with
parameters height, length, ..., obtained at instant t. (b) In the external observer
domain, there is a person P “walking”, tracked by camera C. In this sense, Table
1 shows both domains for goal “Detect hiding person”.
Also, as explained in this paper, the operationalization of the computational
agent conceptual model (KL-EOD) may be formally described as finite state
automata. Fig. 6 shows the four states necessary to model all possibilities for a
person walking through the sidewalk described in Fig. 3. The automaton covers














Fig. 7. Sub-automata illustrating the detection of activity “Person hiding”
all the EOD semantic richness previously explained. Also Fig. 7 is offered il-
lustrating one possible path towards detecting a hiding person in the scenario
described.
6 Conclusions
In this paper the agent concept has been faced from a computational perspec-
tive. Therefore, it has been shown that a computational agent must specify its
conceptual model, its formal model and its implementation, starting from the
set of functional specifications available on its goals, activities and tasks. We are
currently engaged in modeling the visual surveillance task. Surveillance systems
consist of a great diversity of entities that have to cooperate in highly dynamic
and distributed environments. The use of agents for their control allows a greater
degree of autonomy and response because of their capabilities to adapt and to
cooperate.
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